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APPELLATE COURT INTERPRETATION OF KENTUCKY
INHERITANCE TAX STATUTES*
RODMAN SULLIVAN*
The purpose of this article is to consider briefly the inter-
pretation by the courts of the various inheritance tax statutes.
The amount of litigation over enforcement of the collection
of the inheritance tax has been comparatively small, if the num-
ber of cases decided by the Court of Appeals be any measure.
The rates have never been unreasonably high, the exemptions
until 1936 have been quite liberal, and ample time after the
death of the decedent has been allowed for payment. It may be
that these facts partly explain the lack of legal wrangling, as it
might be cheaper or less troublesome to pay than to contest dis-
puted points in the courts; but such a conclusion is mostly a
guess and not readily susceptible of proof. In fact, it might
easily be argued that the various statutes regarding inheritance
taxation have not always been as simple, clear, and comprehen-
sive as they might have been, thereby encouraging or necessi-
tating resort to judicial interpretation. Again, it may be that
the tax was evaded, or at least avoided, by many in its earlier
history and that when such practices became increasingly diffi-
cult under the administration of the Tax Commission the laws
had been amended in the direction of clarity and comprehensive-
ness, so that there was little room to mistake the intent of the
legislature.
The original inheritance tax as enacted in 1906 was very
short, being in fact but the barest outline and omitting points
which would be considered essential in any modern inheritance
tax statute.
As was to be expected, the question of the constitutionality
of the law soon came up for the courts to decide; but the courts
held in its favor.' "An inheritance tax is not a tax on the prop-
* The Kentucky Department of Revenue is publishing simulta-
neously a larger study of inheritance taxation of which this material
is a part.
** Professor of Economics, College of Commerce, University of
Kentucky.
'United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 624; Com. v. Cumberland
Telephone Company, 146 Ky. 142, 142 S.W. 392 (1912); Booth v.
Com., 130 Ky. 88, 113 S.W. 61 (1908).
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erty inherited but is an excise duty on the right to inherit." 2
That section of the law levying a tax on personal property
of nonresident decedents who owned no real property in the
state was later tested in the courts but was held to be valid in
the case of DeWitt v. Commowealth.3 However, no provisions
were made for compelling payment of the tax until 1914. The
case just referred to also held that the law was not rendered
inoperative by reason of this failure to provide such a remedy
and that, if a nonresident died before the passage of the 1914
statute, which did provide such a remedy and a tribunal to en-
force valuation of the property and collection of the tax, the
state could proceed to value the property and collect the tax
at any time before distribution of the estate, even though it
resulted in giving the act a retroactive effect. 4 This retroactive
effect was not carried so far, however, as to apply to a convey-
ance made prior to the passage of the 1906 law whereby prop-
erty was granted reserving a life estate which did not end until
after 1906.-
The 1916 act contained a paragraph which provided that:
"Property of any amount bequeathed or transferred
to any municipal corporation within this state for pub-
lic purposes, to institutions of purely public charity, to
institutions of education not used or employed for gain
by any person or corporation and the income of which
is devoted solely to the cause of education, to public
libraries, or to any person or persons, society, corpo-
ration, institution or association in trust for any of the
purposes above mentioned, shall be exempt from such
tax.,,,
The provision just quoted was soon before the courts for
interpretation. A church was held to be a purely public charity
within the meaning of the act and was therefore exempted from
inheritance taxation.7 Nonresident religious and educational
institutions not operated for gain were also held to be exempt
under the meaning of this act.s
- Bosworth v. Batterton, 159 Ky. 771, 169 S.W. 506 (1914).
187 Ky. 437, 212 S.W. 437 (1920).
'Loc. cit.
Com. v. McCauley's Ex'r., 166 Ky. 450, 179 S.W. 411 (1915).
'Kentucky Acts, 1916, chap. xxvi, p. 296.
Sage's Ex'rs. v. Com., 196 Ky. 257, 244 S.W. 779 (1922).
Bingham's Adm'r. v. Com., 196 Ky. 318, 244 S.W. 781 (1922).
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The courts were asked to determine whether the 1924 act
placed cousins in Class B with nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles,
etc., or in Class C with strangers-in-blood. Though cousins are
not specifically mentioned, the inclusion of some kin by marriage
might indicate that it was the intent of the legislature to in-
clude all reasonably close blood relations, but in the case of
Commonivealth v. Thompson's Administrator9 it was held that
cousins were in Class C.
The "contemplation of death" clause was taken before the
courts in 1930. In the case of State Tax Commission v. Robin-
son's Ex'r.,'0 it was held that, "In so far as this subsection pro-
vided an irrebuttable presumption in that a gift made within
three years of death shall be deemed one made in contemplation
of death, it is unconstitutional."
A second case interpreting this clause was decided in 1940.
The decedent gave, during a period from one to seven months
before his death, gifts in the form of bonds to an amount of
$30,000 to his wife and daughters. The latter contended that
these gifts were not made in contemplation of death as the donor
was enjoying normal health, and furthermore, that they did not
constitute a material part of the estate. (The estate was valued
for taxation purposes at $649,000.) They also stated that for
many years prior to his death it was customary for the decedent
to make gifts to his wife and daughters. It is obvious that the
distributor could have disposed of his entire estate within a few
years if he had continued to make gifts at that rate. The high
court ruled that, although the decedent might not have thought
of his death as imminent, the gifts were motivated by the thought
of death and were therefore taxable."
The reasoning in this case appears to have established the
line of thought which the court will follow as it was quoted with
approval in a subsequent case to be mentioned below.
"Gifts made in contemplation of death within the
meaning of the Inheritance Tax Act are gifts motivated
by the thought of death. This does not mean that the
donor must believe that death is imminent. The pur-
pose of inserting in inheritance tax laws provisions for
taxing gifts made in contemplation of death is to pre-
vent evasion of the tax by transfers which are merely
9 225 Ky. 75, 7 S.W. 2d 848 (1928).
10234 Ky. 415, 28 S.W. 2d 491 (1930).
Chase's Ex'x. v. Com., 284 Ky. 471, 145 S.W. 58 (1940).
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substitutes for testamentary dispositions, and the de-
termination of the nature of the gifts turns on the mo-
tive of the donor. The value of the gift, age of the
donor, and condition of his health are some of the
circumstances to be considered in determining the
question of motive."
In the next case involving this principle the donees did not
deny that a material part of the estate had been given since
the gifts amounted to about two-thirds of its value, but based
their claim of exemption on the fact that the donor, who was
past 83 when he made the gifts, was actuated by the desire to
see the donees in present enjoyment of the property and estab-
lished with a separate competency. The court held that these
motives are not necessarily inconsistent with the transfer of the
property in contemplation of death. 12 The Commonwealth's
hand in this case was strengthened by the fact the donor had
been ill for twelve of the fifteen months next preceding the gifts
and had undergone two operations.
Certain Tax Commission orders have also dealt with the
subject of contemplation of death. These orders have the force
and effect of law unless they are overruled upon appeal to the
courts. In one case 13 farms in the possession of sons since 1915
were willed to them in 1935 and deeded to them in 1941. The
donor died in 1943 at age 86. The third farm had been in the
possession of a son for 11 years. They were held to be gifts not
made in contemplation of death, but gifts of cash made in 1942
were so held.
Credits without adequate consideration on a note entered
prior to kmowledge of the decedent of the serious state of his
health were held not to have been made in contemplation of death
though death occurred within 11 months of the credit entry.'4
Property owned by joint tenants with right of survivorship
was held to be taxable to the extent of the interest of the co-
tenant who died, by the decision in DztBois' Administrator v.
,hawiw.'15 Some of the difficulties involved in taxing property
claimed to be jointly owned are illustrated by a case where the
administratrix claimed to be a partner of the decedent holding
Sellinger's Admr., et al. v. Reeves, et al., 292 Ky. 114, 166 S.W.
54 (1942).
'"Dawson Estate, Order No. 392, April 11, 1944.
14 Stephenson Estate, Order No. 373, Nov. 18, 1943.
S275 Ky. 516, 122 S.W. 2d 251 (1938).
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one-half interest in certain property.10 The commission deter-
mined as a matter of fact that there was no partnership interest.
The practice of valuing the estate and distributable shares
as of the date of death of the distributor was upheld in Cochraii's
Executor and Trustee v. Conunon wealth.17 However, in another
case, the Court, while reiterating this principle, further held
that past and future valuations may be looked to as potent
evidence bearing on and pointing to the valuation on the re-
quired date.1s This was an unusual case as the plaintiff main-
tained that the value of real and personal property was drasti-
cally reduced by the bank moratorium, making ordinary values
meaningless as of the date of decedent's death, because virtually
all buying and selling were estopped by inability to obtain means
of payment. The court would not accept such a narrow view
of the phrase "at the time of death."
The five-year limitation against the right of action of the
Commonwealth to collect an inheritance tax has been held not
to begin until eighteen months or more after the death of the
decedent in the case of Ritcher v. Common wealth,' 9 and Com-
wonwealth, By, Etc. v. Payvter.20  Acceptance by the Revenue
Department of a payment of inheritance tax by the personal
representative of the estate prior to the assessment of the tax
by the department is tentative only and does not prevent an in-
crease of the tax based upon increased valuations as a result of
investigation of the property. Furthermore in the absence of
a showing of a bona fide dispute and a compromise intentionally
entered into, a check marked "in full payment" of a tax does
not prevent the recovery by the Commonwealth of the correct
amount of the tax due.2 -
In many respects the most upsetting decision of the Court
of Appeals was the overthrow of the method of taxation in cases
of power of appointment. Under the 1924 law the Department
of Revenue taxed such bequests at the rates and valuations in
effect at the death of the donee according to the relationship of
the beneficiaries to the donee. It continued to do so under the
"Howe Estate, Order No. 248, July 6, 1942.
"241 Ky. 656, 44 S.W. 2d 603 (1932).
"Com. v. Wood's Ex'x., 297 Ky. 583, 180 S.W. 2d 312 (1944).
"180 Ky. 4, 201 S.W. 456 (1918).
' 222 Ky. 766, 2 S.W. 2d 664 (1927).
"Com., et al. v. Wood, 289 Ky. 649, 159 S.W. 2d 403 (1942).
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1936 act. This method was upheld by the Court of Appeals in
1940 in sustaining the constitutionality of the statutory sec-
tion'22 for the reason that it cannot be determined until the
donee's death to whom the property will go. "It is the settled
rule in Kentucky that when the donee of a power exercises the
appointment, he is disposing of the property of the donor".
the beneficiary had no right to the possession and enjoy-
ment of the estate until the donee's death, and thus a new right
came into existence and it is this which the statute has taxed".
But the proviso attached to the section on appointment as re-
enacted in 1942 called for taxation as of the date of death of
the donor and was held by the court to take precedence over
the remainder of the section. 23 The donor died in 1929, the donee
in 1939. In accordance with this decision the Department of
Revenue made the valuations as of the death of the donee (1936
Act), levied the rates of the 1924 act, which were in effect at the
death of the donor, in accordance with relationship to the donor.
The full effect of this decision was felt in the order2 4 of the tax
commission in a 1944 case involving the exercise of a power of
appointment made prior to the enactment of the earliest inherit-
ance tax (1906). No taxes were held to be due though the ap-
pointment was exercised in 1943.
A border-line case was that of a will giving to his wife all
of a man's estate with full power to sell but expressing a desire
that the property undisposed of by her go to the children. This
will was held to give a life estate to the wife with remainder
to the children instead of a fee simple interest to her.25
In a recent case - , the court held that possession and enjoy-
ment of property did not take effect at or after death and that
the decedent derived no income from the property where he
had deeded farms to his children several years prior to his death
but had retained the right to approve sales of the property and
investments of the proceeds, to settle controversies between his
children regarding the leasing of the property, and had further
"'Commonwealth, et al. v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Com-
pany, et al., 285 Ky. 1, 146 S. W. 2d 3 (1940).
, Reeves v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Company, 293 Ky. 544,
169 S.W. 2d 621 (1943) (1942 as modified 1943).
' Number 390.
'Berner, et al. v. Luckett, 299 Ky. 744, 186 S.W. 2d 907 (1945).
Commonwealth, et al. v. Nelson P. Van Meter, Jr. Ex'r., et al.,
301 Ky. 132, 190 S.W. 2d 668 (1946).
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provided for the payment of quarterly sums equal to the rental
value to himself and wife during their lives. It was also held
that the circuit court where the property was situated had
jurisdiction to quiet title to property when an inheritance tax
lien existed.
The Department of Revenue had included the value of the
property in the gross estate and contended that by reason of the
control retained and the income paid to the decedent he had not
actually parted with his property and that true possession and
enjoyment did not come to the children of the decedent until
his death. It further contended that, the Kentucky law being
modeled after the New York law, decisions under the New York
law should be followed rather than federal estate tax decisions
even though an amendment to the Kentucky law was similar to
the federal statute.
The problem of estates in trust came before the Court of
Appeals again in the case of W. B. Allen's Executor v. Howard.27
1Here the property had passed under power of appointment
created by the donor under irrevocable trusts which were ex-
ecuted during the lifetime of the donor in 1924 and 1935. The
donor died in 1941. The Court held that the trusts were un-
affected by the death of the testator and that the remainder
interests thereby created did not fall within the purview of sec-
tion 140.010, Kentucky Revised Statutes.
One of the most elusive legal points to be decided by the
Court was that involved in the valuation of an estate which in-
cluded an interest-bearing note payable to the decedent by his
insolvent son, who was one of the beneficiaries. The beneficial
share was more than sufficient to reimburse the estate for prin-
cipal and interest of the note. The Court held that the note and
accrued interest must be included in the distributable estate
of the decedent and were subject to the transfer tax.28
Decided Oct 4, 1946.
Gearhart's Ex'r. and Ex'x. v. Howard, 302 Ky. 709, 196 S.W.
2d 113 (1946).
